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Othered Body, Obscene Self(ie): A Sartrean 
Reading of Kim Kardashian-West 
Elese Dowden 
In this existential reading of Kim Kardashian-West’s International 
Women’s Day selfie of 2016, I focus on the rise of selfie culture and public 
discourse around emerging digital representations of women’s bodies. The 
selfie is a relatively new phenomenon, and is particularly curious because 
of the subject/object paradox it creates; in taking a selfie, a person asserts 
control over their own image, but at the same time, becomes object in their 
own gaze. My argument is that selfies, like other assertions of bodily 
subjectivity in digital spaces, are a threat to patriarchal structures that 
paint women as immanent, object, as reflected in public discourse around 
Kardashian-West’s International Women’s Day selfie. I draw on both Jean-
Paul Sartre and Simone de Beauvoir’s work on subjectivity in 
existentialism and phenomenology, as well as Amy Shields Dobson’s work 
on post-feminism and young women’s projections of self, in order to 
delineate what it is about the selfie that creates this paradox. I also make 
reference to the work of Elisabeth Grosz and Frantz Fanon in relation to a 
colonial hierarchy that prioritises body over mind, as well as Laura 
Mulvey’s work on the male gaze. 
 
It seems that now, more than ever, young people, particularly 
women, are substantially immersed in digital cultures and digital 
communities. While there has always been social pressure for women 
to conform to certain beauty ideals, this pressure takes on new forms, 
particularly when we think about social media and the concept of the 
“selfie.” In this paper I lay out a framework for a contemporary 
Sartrean and feminist reading of Kim Kardashian-West’s 2016 
International Women’s Day selfie, using Amy Shields Dobson’s 
notion of postfeminist femininity. I argue that Kardashian-West 
embodies and embraces this new mode of femininity with her 
projections of self in social media. To begin, I expound some of the 
key concepts in Sartre’s Being and Nothingness, and then apply this to 
the present-day setting in a consideration of structural oppression and 
the internalisation of the male gaze. Next, I move to a discussion of 
obscenity and obscene bodies, highlighting that while a Sartrean 
sadomasochistic paradox may be at play in postfeminist projections of 
subjectivity, performative femininity is not a binary between passive 
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internalisation and active defiance. Sartre’s conceptions of sadism and 
masochism also feature centrally as I use these two notions in the 
context of Kim Kardashian-West’s International Women’s Day selfie. 
Lastly, with this framework in mind, I move to an analysis of Kim 
Kardashian-West’s subject/object blurring in her taking of the selfie. 
Being-for-others 
It would be an understatement to say that Kim Kardashian-West’s 
International Women’s Day selfie of 2016 caused a bit of a fuss. The 
selfie, which depicts Kardashian-West posing naked in a mirror, 
garnered over 340,000 comments on Instagram alone. Many reactions 
affirmed Kardashian-West’s actions, but there were also many that 
denounced the selfie. While the picture made no reference to 
Kardashian-West’s two children, commenters made express reference 
to them, with remarks including “so sad for your kids little disgusting 
thing [sic]” and “what are your children going to say about this” 
(Kardashian-West “When You’re Like I Have Nothing to Wear Lol”)? 
I argue that this exemplifies a kind of moral panic in public discourse, 
where onlookers essentialise Kardashian-West and can only see her in 
her proximity to the roles of wife and mother. The selfie elicited this 
response because Kardashian-West’s image was an expression of her 
own bodily subjectivity, that challenged both the male gaze of the 
public because it was a selfie, and also contemporary notions of 
performative femininity. This challenge is indicative of a new genre, 
albeit a paradoxical one, of modern femininity. I will examine the 
structure of these responses and the nature of postfeminist femininity 
more thoroughly later in this paper. 
To comprehend why the public responded in such a way to 
Kardashian-West’s expression of subjectivity, I will begin by 
considering the three different types of being that Jean-Paul Sartre 
delineates in Being and Nothingness. First—there is being-in-itself, 
which is the kind of being we might ascribe to, say, a pair of glasses or 
a cup of coffee. This type of being is self-contained, and “does not 
enter into any connection with what is not itself” (22). My glasses, like 
my cup of coffee, are not conscious and have no potential for 
transcendence or the for-itself in that they are not filled with potential 
in the way that autonomous, embodied subjects like you or I might 
be. Both are complete and non-autonomous—they simply are. Our 
bodies are, to an extent, like this. A body becomes obscene when it is 
reduced to the in-itself, which I will expand on later in this paper. The 
body is a representation of immanence, and so being-for-itself pertains 
to transcendence, which is the basis for Sartre’s existentialism. Being-
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for-itself is a mode of being that is not pre-determined—instead it is a 
free form of being, defined by consciousness, negation, freedom and 
spontaneity. A for-itself is continually creating itself, continually 
moving toward endless possibilities, and being-for-itself is this 
movement. As a for-itself, I am different from my glasses and my cup 
of coffee in that I get to choose my fate. I am conscious and radically 
free with an open future of infinite possibilities before me. This is not 
to say that my future is necessarily one that promises great 
opportunities or success, but rather that as a free agent I have a large 
range of potential action. Perhaps I might take up deep-sea diving, or 
win a Nobel prize. Perhaps I might eat a peach. My glasses, however, 
will continue to be glasses, and my cup of coffee will continue to be a 
cup of coffee. With these two modes of being in mind, I now turn to 
the third mode of being as defined by Sartre. This mode of being is 
called being-for-others, and is a key part of this paper.  
To have being-for-others is to be aware of your own being reduced to 
the in-itself in another being’s awareness. It is the product of the 
Other’s “look,” and a good example of this is the feeling invoked 
when one is caught observing or being observed by a neighbour, for 
example. If being-for-itself is an act produced by the negation and 
nothingness of freedom and free consciousness, being-for-others is a 
kind of existential grounding, tied to self-objectification. It may be the 
case that each subject is fluctuating between all three modes: being-in-
itself, being-for-itself and being-for-others. I now use Thomas Martin’s 
explanation of the relationship between the two kinds of being. 
Martin says that “being-for-others and being-for-itself are two poles of 
being between which the self oscillates” (244). Shame and pride are 
borne of the feeling of the Other’s look—perhaps I spill my cup of 
coffee down my shirt as I am speaking to you—this might be a source 
of shame. That shame is a kind of loose self-objectification, as all at 
once I find myself an object in your presence, judging myself 
according to your look. In this scenario I might see myself as an object 
against your background of the world, instead of as a subject in my 
own experience. In this way the look is almost a paradox—we are 
simultaneously a subject in our own world and an object for the other 
in their world. It is the look that entails a kind of possession, as Sartre 
elucidates: 
I am possessed by the Other; the Other’s look fashions my 
body in its nakedness, causes it to be born, sculptures it, 
produces it as it is, sees it as I shall never see it. The Other 
holds a secret—the secret of what I am. He makes me be and 
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thereby he possesses me, and this possession is nothing other 
than the consciousness of possessing me. (386) 
Feminist readings of Sartre’s work reveal that he essentialises 
women in his philosophy, and particularly in his novels (Collins and 
Pierce 125). The usage of the word “he” to denote the subject in the 
previous passage is thus significant in that self-objectification, 
particularly for people who don’t identify as heterosexual men, often 
stems from the patriarchal male gaze. The subject is made to feel as 
though they are possessed in some way by the other person, as 
though their access to their perception of themselves is limited.  
The feeling of possession by the gaze of the other is a part of 
systematic marginalisation. As Marguerite La Caze notes, “oppression 
creates a structural context where humiliation is assumed, taken in, 
and focused on the self and so experienced as shame” (90). While 
there are many sources of shame and pride that are not synonymous 
with systems of oppression, there are equally many sources of shame 
and pride that are. If I spill my coffee on myself my shame in front of 
you is not necessarily connected to my social positioning. Shame does 
become infinitely more complicated, however, when my source of 
shame stems from a form of non-compliance with social norms. This 
is the kind of structural context in which shame is internalised. In this 
context, shame may function as a tool of oppression. To illustrate, I 
consider the experience of Bonnie, who identifies herself as a fat 
woman, and is a participant in a study by Jeannine Gailey of fat 
women’s experiences of dating. Bonnie describes a scene in which she 
is sitting in a doctor’s office, looking through a magazine: 
I was flipping through a Reader’s Digest, and you know how 
they have all those funny little things in there? And one of 
them was a story, and it said, ‘If it wasn’t for alcohol, fat girls 
would never get laid.’ And I remember sitting in that office, 
and the tears coming to my eyes, and feeling so exposed, even 
though nobody knew what I had just read… . I didn’t see 
myself as desirable. I didn’t see myself as—I just didn’t see 
myself as someone who men dated. (Gailey 84) 
Bonnie’s experience of shame stems from internalised structural 
oppression, where women’s bodies are meant to fit a certain mould of 
normative, white femininity. In talking about normative white 
femininity, I refer to Western beauty standards that dictate that for a 
woman to be desirable, she should be thin, white, heterosexual and 
feminine. In invoking normative white femininity, I invoke a white, 
middle class subject. Increasingly, and particularly in the digital 
sphere, feminine traits associated with beauty include “slimness, large 
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breasts, curvaceousness, white tanned skin” (Carah and Dobson 8). 
Women who fit this ideal are assigned a higher position in social 
hierarchy according to the male gaze. As someone who does not fit 
this strict ideal, Bonnie is prompted by the Reader’s Digest story to feel 
humiliation after being made to see herself as an object in the 
background of another’s existence. I argue that this is an example of 
shame at feeling as though one’s body is obscene (and not graceful), 
and this feeling of shame functions as a method of control over 
women’s bodily subjectivity. This in itself is a mode of being-for-others, 
as I argue that wanting to have a graceful body is an internalised form 
of Sartre’s sadomasochism as I will explain in the sections that follow. 
These ideas are all particularly salient in public discourse around 
obscene and Othered bodies, which brings me to the next point. 
Obscene and othered bodies 
Obscenity is a product of shame, and in this section I focus 
particularly on a patriarchal form of shame invoked by the male gaze. 
First, it is important to define precisely what it is I mean by 
“patriarchy” and “male gaze.” In invoking the notion of “patriarchy,” 
my definition is taken from Carole Pateman’s work on women’s 
exclusion from the social contract and other bases for civil society, 
which feeds into men’s patriarchal right over women. While the 
margins have extended markedly over the last hundred years, there 
remain numerous ways in which white, able-bodied heterosexual 
men hold privilege over people of differing abilities, races, sexes and 
genders. This is the patriarchal right of man. Further to this, in 
invoking the concept of the “male gaze,” I make reference to feminist 
film theorist Laura Mulvey who, in the 1970s, delineated the look of 
the male other—the predominantly white, masculine and 
heterosexual other. I also make reference to Simone de Beauvoir, who 
also expounded this phenomenon in her best-known work, The Second 
Sex. This gaze is the phenomenon in which women’s bodies are 
sexualised for the pleasure of a masculine subject (Loreck). If a 
person’s body is not thought to be pleasurable for a masculine subject 
to look at, it is likely to be considered obscene. This is exemplified by 
Bonnie’s experience in the previous section.  
It is important, however, to note that in the postfeminist era, people 
are not limited to invoking passive internalisations of the male gaze 
or active forms of defiance. Emerging modes of femininity blur the 
boundaries between these two modes to give way to new kinds of 
sexuality, gender, femininity and Otherness. Amy Shields Dobson 
highlights that:  
122 • HECATE 
Along with more ‘active’ and ‘desiring’ constructions of 
sexuality, cultural scholars have noted that in postfeminist 
mediascapes girls and young women are depicted and 
addressed as fun-loving, consumption focused, and more 
‘empowered,’ active, and bold, physically, socially, and 
psychologically. Such constructions of femininity can be seen 
as a response to feminist critique of earlier, weaker versions of 
femininity portrayed widely in media and cultural 
representations. (Dobson 23) 
I argue that the image projection of an active, desiring subject is a 
response to public perceptions of feminine subjects as submissive and 
in need of rescuing. Consider, for example, the production of Disney 
Pixar films. There has been a slow shift from the trope of the helpless 
princess in search of a male love interest, as depicted in the tales of 
Snow White or Sleeping Beauty, to the much fiercer and more 
autonomous heroine, as seen in more recent films like Frozen, Brave or 
Moana (although it ought to be noted that usually these heroines are 
white, heterosexual, able-bodied women, so there may still be quite a 
way to go). To reiterate, the complexity of this postfeminist mode of 
femininity must be emphasised, particularly because I wish to avoid 
casting the contemporary context as a kind of wasteland dichotomy 
where non-male subjects swing wildly between immanence, in the 
mode of being-for-itself, and transcendence, in the mode of being-for-
others. Young people, particularly young women, are increasingly 
cultivating images of self that do not clearly defy, nor conform to, 
patriarchal notions of normative, white femininity, which has 
historically, in the West, been a (problematic) cultural mode to which 
young women aspire. This presents some curious problems for 
feminist theory in that the male gaze may still be internalised, but 
instead it is transformed into a projection and an expression of 
subjectivity, femininity, gender and sexuality outwards into the 
world. Those that actively perform this postfeminist femininity are 
autonomous subjects, but often this manifestation is problematic, and 
there is much work to be done on the blurring of boundaries and 
tropes around the appropriate ways in which femininity is expressed. 
I mentioned earlier in this paper that Kardashian-West was met with 
over 340,000 comments—among them quite a few that condemned 
her for being a “bad role model”—after posting the selfie on 
Instagram. She responded in an open letter on her website, saying: 
I am empowered by my body. I am empowered by my 
sexuality. I am empowered by feeling comfortable in my skin. 
I am empowered by showing the world my flaws and not 
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being afraid of what anyone is going to say about me. And I 
hope that through this platform I have been given, I can 
encourage the same empowerment for girls and women all 
over the world. I am a mother. I am a wife, a sister, a 
daughter, an entrepreneur and I am allowed to be sexy. 
(Kardashian-West, “Happy International Women’s Day”) 
Kardashian-West affirms her autonomy and her subjectivity—she is 
allowed to make herself desirable and does not rely on the male 
subject to make her body graceful. To return to Sartre, however, the 
obscene body is a woman’s body. The obscene body is reduced to 
object status, to the mode of being-in-itself, and this is what makes it 
obscene. The body is viewed as an object of stark immanence where 
there should be a transcendent subject. It is of course possible that this 
might not be the case, and indeed visual art forms often depict 
women’s bodies in states of immanence, as graceful bodies. However, 
to return to Sartre, we can imagine it unlikely that he had a man in 
mind when he said “the sight of a naked body from behind is not 
obscene. But certain involuntary waddlings of the rump are obscene” 
(423).  
Nonetheless, I will now examine normative white femininity in 
relation to subjugation and Otherness, and invoke Elizabeth Grosz in 
highlighting the prominent Western dichotomy that implies a 
hierarchy of the mind over the body. This hierarchy has a large 
influence on the privileging of the mind, associated with maleness, 
over the body, which is associated with femaleness, and according to 
popular myth, it is natural and necessary that one is subjugated by the 
other (Grosz 3). This hierarchy is even more problematic when we 
consider the ways in which non-white people are primordialised, and 
further reduced to the category of the body. Frantz Fanon delineated 
this phenomenon in the 1930s, and it continues to the present day: 
The native is declared insensible to ethics; he represents not 
only the absence of values, but also the negation of values … 
He is the corrosive element, destroying all that comes near 
him; he is the deforming element, disfiguring all that has to do 
with beauty or morality; he is the depository of maleficent 
powers, the unconscious and irretrievable instrument of blind 
forces. (Fanon 41) 
The racialising of the non-white Other as object, as being-in-itself, is 
symptomatic of a wider patriarchal form of Othering that relegates all 
people who aren’t white cis-men to the category of the body, or the 
female. Elizabeth Grosz describes the body as being defined by this 
negation; as being “what is not mind, what is distinct from and other 
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than the privileged term… It is implicitly defined as unruly, 
disruptive, in need of direction and judgement” (3). I argue that in 
some ways, new modes of femininity as elucidated earlier by Dobson 
embrace this negation. Women have been reduced to the category of 
the body for so long that it seems they may be attempting to reclaim 
it. This may be Kim Kardashian-West’s intent in posting her 
International Women’s Day selfie, which was clearly considered 
unruly and disruptive by those that chose to shame her in their 
comments on Instagram. Kardashian-West’s selfie invoked a response 
that overwhelmingly called for her to reform her misdirected ways, 
and the public here reduced Kardashian-West to the status of object, 
body, negation: something to be conquered. 
And so, an explanation is beginning to emerge from the cloak of 
moral panic surrounding Kim Kardashian-West’s naked selfies. The 
obscene body is the exposed body—it is a body that refuses to be 
shrouded by the standards and limitations of white patriarchy and of 
conservative femininity, and yet at the same time, some bodies 
remain obscene even when conforming to these standards. We might, 
for example, consider the kinds of bodies depicted in Playboy or GQ 
magazine. These bodies are photoshopped to conform to the 
standards of white patriarchy, however, there is not a clear-cut line 
between “obscene” and “graceful” bodies when they are curated and 
shaped to conform in this way. Nonetheless, to return to the subject at 
hand, on Sartre’s reading, “the supreme challenge of grace is to 
exhibit the body unveiled with no clothing, with no veil except grace 
itself. The most graceful body is the naked body whose acts enclose it 
with an invisible visible garment while entirely disrobing its flesh, 
while the flesh is totally present to the eyes of the spectators” (422). 
The obscene body is not a subtle body—but a graceful body may be 
transfigured into an obscene body by an obscene act. I argue that the 
notion of obscenity is used in a patriarchal way and, accordingly, 
transcendence entails rising above the lens dictated by the patriarchy. 
Men’s bodies can most certainly be obscene; it is, however, much less 
common for this fact to be used to shame them into submission. 
Consider this passage from Simone de Beauvoir: 
A woman who teases male desire too blatantly is considered 
vulgar; but a woman who is seen to repudiate this is 
disreputable as well: she is seen as wanting to look like a man: 
she’s a lesbian; or to single herself out: she’s an eccentric; 
refusing her role as object, she defies society: she’s an 
anarchist. If she simply does not want to be noticed, she must 
still conserve her femininity. (652) 
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It might be helpful to think about Miley Cyrus, who was once a 
Disney poster girl. White, thin and blond, she was deemed an 
acceptable role model for young women as an exemplary model of 
normative, white femininity. In 2013, however, Cyrus began to project 
an overtly-sexualised and purposefully vulgar image that did not 
conform to this standard of white femininity. Following her Wrecking 
Ball transformation, for which she cut her hair short and began to 
cultivate an image that entailed tight, revealing clothing, Cyrus has 
now become Beauvoir’s “eccentric; refusing her role as object, she 
defies society: she’s an anarchist” (Beauvoir 652). Cyrus, in some 
ways, defies the male gaze by reclaiming her own bodily subjectivity 
and shocking people into seeing her subjectivity. This may be most 
clearly demonstrated by her Wrecking Ball video—in the Director’s 
Cut version, all we are shown is an emotional Cyrus, singing directly 
to the camera and breaking the fourth wall (Cyrus, Director’s Cut). 
However, in the official version of this music video, Cyrus is much 
more overtly sexualised, swinging on a wrecking ball naked and 
seductively licking a hammer (Cyrus, Wrecking Ball). This is an 
interesting difference, as in the Director’s Cut it is as though Cyrus is 
challenging the male gaze with her own direct gaze, raw and 
emotional, gazing back at the masculine subject.  
In contrast, the official video depicts Cyrus in a similarly subjective 
way, breaking the fourth wall, but in a curiously sexualised way 
instead. It is in this act that the anarchy and obscenity lies, as 
women’s bodily subjectivity is, in 2018, still something that the 
Western public considers to be cause for concern. However, Miley 
Cyrus is still performing a form of overt sexuality, and while this may 
be empowering for her, in some ways it also reinforces the sexual 
objectification of the female subject, and this is where it presents a 
challenge for contemporary feminist theory. Nonetheless, obscenity is 
tied to sadism and masochism in Sartre’s work in that the male gaze is 
one that derives pleasure from grace and claims patriarchal right over 
bodily subjectivity by systems that seek to control non-masculine 
bodies by ensuring that they internalise their own oppression. The 
public ridicule of women for their bodily subjectivity is thus a power 
tactic. I now turn to a discussion of sadism and masochism in Sartre’s 
work to illuminate the concept of the male gaze in popular discourse.  
The sadomasochistic paradox 
Sadism, according to Sartre, is “an effort to incarnate the Other 
through violence,” and is like desire in that it “seeks to strip the Other 
of the acts which hide him. It seeks to reveal the flesh beneath the 
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action. But whereas the for-itself in desire loses itself in its own flesh in 
order to reveal to the Other that he too is flesh, the sadist refuses his 
own flesh at the same time that he uses instruments to reveal by force 
the Other’s flesh to him” (Sartre 421). In the previous section, I 
touched on the concept of the graceful body, and I will examine 
Kardashian-West’s selfie in relation to this concept later in this 
section. While in Sartre’s work a woman’s body is only graceful when 
a man’s desire is projected upon it, the ideal, graceful body is, in the 
context of Western patriarchy, the white, feminine body. It is the 
opposite of Beauvoir’s anarchist body, and is one to which those who 
have internalised the standards of the patriarchy aspire. Because this 
body is cloaked in grace, it is one that is inaccessible, or unobtainable. 
Sartre’s sadist seeks to occupy or possess this body through violence 
and force. I argue that it is possible to be both a sadist and a masochist 
in attempting to emulate the beauty ideals of normative white 
femininity, and that this is an embodiment of the mode of being-for-
others as one attempts to contort one’s body into a certain form in 
order to fit into an external standard. I also argue that the male gaze, 
whether internalised and manifest as shame, or outward, looking 
toward and trying to possess other bodies, is a harmful tool of 
oppression.  
A graceful body appears as an inaccessible body, and the sadist 
seeks to control the body of the Other by rendering the Other’s body 
object, reducing that body to flesh. The graceful body is thus a threat 
to one’s own freedom, as it projects the subject forth into the mode of 
being-for-others. Celebrity bodies are already commodified for us to 
some extent, and a consequence of this may be that they are more 
easily transformed into immanent bodies, objects, fit for public 
consumption, as Western audiences are already used to a certain kind 
of celebrity narrative that may reduce or limit perceptions of celebrity 
subjectivity. Nonetheless, as someone who identifies as a woman, it is 
difficult not to internalise the male gaze, which in turn means that 
graceful bodies, or subjects that embody normative white femininity, 
are, from a certain lens, a threat to my own being-for-itself and bodily 
subjectivity because they remind me of my place in the patriarchal 
hierarchy. In this sense, I am compelled to emulate the graceful other 
by conforming to patriarchal beauty standards through grooming, 
strict diet and exercise, expensive beauty treatments and further 
mechanisms that function to bring my own image closer to that of the 
graceful other. “The sadist … wants to make the Other’s flesh appear; 
and in its very appearance the flesh will destroy grace, and facticity 
will reabsorb the Other’s freedom-as-object” (Sartre 424). By 
attempting to emulate this graceful other, I exist for-others, setting 
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aside my own bodily subjectivity and denying my own radical 
freedom.  
At the same time, this transforms me into a masochist. I embody the 
mode of being-for-others and allow myself to be defined by the other in 
trying to emulate normative white femininity. I am the liar and the 
lied-to. “I refuse to be anything more than an object. I rest upon the 
Other, and as I experience this being-as-object in shame, I will and I 
love my shame as the profound sign of my objectivity. As the Other 
apprehends me as object by means of actual desire, I wish to be 
desired, I make myself in shame an object of desire” (Sartre 400). In 
transforming the self into an immanent object as a transcendent 
subject, one is simultaneously this liar and the lied-to. This, I argue, is 
the sadomasochistic paradox of postfeminist femininity in connection 
with the male gaze. It is the act of internalising the male gaze and 
reflexively turning it back on oneself in an attempt to fit the beauty 
standards of normative white femininity. Postfeminist projections of 
self often exemplify this phenomenon, and I argue that while 
Kardashian-West works hard to fit a mould of normative femininity, 
she is still subject to a great deal of criticism, as the public reduces her 
being to the category of the body. The male gaze is reflected back to 
us in her selfie, and the public reaction to her selfie made this 
particularly apparent. I turn now to an examination of Kardashian-
West’s intent with the projection of the image, as well as the public 
response to this image projection. 
To be clear, Kim Kardashian-West’s International Women’s Day 
selfie was not entirely nude. The image depicts Kardashian-West in 
her bathroom, in a private and domestic sphere, taking an image of 
her reflection in a mirror. In this sense it is an image of an image, and 
this is important because it establishes a new distance between subject 
and object. Kardashian-West takes control over her own image by 
taking a selfie, and in this way the image is an expression of being-for-
itself, of authentic being and of autonomy. However, there is a 
paradox in that at the same time, the image exhibits an awareness of 
the male gaze, and of the presence of Kardashian-West’s own body in 
the presence of the other, or her audience, which we might consider a 
form of being-for-others. Kardashian-West literally becomes a spectator 
to her own being. There is tape over the more “obscene” parts of her 
body, which may be to comply with Instagram’s rules around 
showing nipples and other signifiers of a naked body, but may also be 
to fit into the kind of grey area of subversiveness that Dobson 
delineates with her notion of postfeminist femininity. “Self-
representational practices performatively signal one’s ability to 
‘reveal interiority,’ to be ‘transparently’ available to one’s viewers in a 
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networked public” (Dobson 105). Kardashian-West performs this 
emerging mode of femininity by creating an appearance of openness 
and transparency in sharing images of her life and her body publicly 
across multiple platforms. 
Sartre’s supreme challenge of grace is, as noted earlier in this paper, 
to simultaneously reveal and cloak the body with “no veil except 
grace itself” (422). In many ways, this is Kardashian-West’s project. 
She exhibits a paradoxical image—she is both naked and not naked, 
catering to the ideals of normative femininity and defying them by 
not pandering to a conservative status quo, and simultaneously 
projects an image of herself that is taken both by herself and of 
herself, as a subject and as an object. The selfie is deliberately 
provocative, and the nudity involved seems to make a claim towards 
authenticity consistent with Dobson’s postfeminist femininity. In 
order to tie some of the earlier themes of this paper together with the 
later themes, I return to Sartre’s notion of being-for-others. You may 
recall that the mode of being-for-others entails feeling as though one is 
possessed by the other, or the feeling of being an object in another’s 
world. Women, particularly non-white women, are relegated to a 
kind of status of perpetual other, perpetual Object. While Kim 
Kardashian-West complies with a postfeminist standard of 
femininity, exemplifying a self-aware image of her own sexuality, she 
is also refusing to comply with other public standards of appropriate 
behaviour. In posting a nude selfie, Kardashian-West does disrupt the 
patriarchal male gaze, but it may still be the case that she is being-for-
others, internalising the sadomasochistic Sartrean paradox. 
To conclude, I acknowledge that there are limits to our knowledge 
of Kardashian-West’s authentic self, and the lines between character 
and projection of self are blurred for anyone in the public eye, 
particularly for those who don’t identify as cis-men. In talking about 
authenticity I make reference back to the discussion of being-for-others 
and the oscillation between being-for-itself and being-in-itself as 
described in the earlier part of this paper. It may be possible that 
Kardashian-West embodies a mode of being-for-others in projecting her 
nude selfie across the internet. Perhaps all forms of social media entail 
some kind of being-for-others, particularly emerging forms of digital 
expression that make claims to authenticity while simultaneously 
embracing increasingly conventional notions of heterosexual 
femininity. Kardashian-West’s image is a curated one, and a nude 
image sends a particular message. Her figure is transformed to some 
degree by the perceived obscenity of the act of posting a naked selfie 
on the internet, which echoes a claim to being-for-itself. She is 
simultaneously cloaked and revealed in a masterful projection of self-
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image. Kardashian-West, like a number of women in the digital age, is 
both the liar and the lied-to, the sadist and the masochist. Ultimately, 
Kardashian-West has taken up the terms of Sartre’s supreme 
challenge of grace, succeeded and, perhaps, may have even 
transcended them in her expression of a mode of autonomous 
postfeminist embodiment.  
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